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In order to make good and informed decisions, it is important to have as full an understanding as 
possible of the current situation, especially when a wrong decision can cost one not only their own 
but also their colleagues’ lives. The present study takes place in the context of a course which trains 
military officers of various nationalities to serve in UN peacekeeping operations as unarmed military 
observers (UNMO). The focus of the study is on cases where teams of trainees on the course are 
taking part in a car-patrolling exercise, where they encounter simulated, ‘life-threatening’ incidents, 
in which roughly half of the teams ‘suffer casualties’. By studying video-recorded interactions inside 
and around the patrol cars, I use conversation analysis (CA) to examine what happens between the 
first noticing of an incident and the jointly agreed, or at least ‘not-resisted’, decision regarding what 
their next action should be, and how the trainees work together to form a categorization of the 
situation. CA is a qualitative, data-driven research method tightly based on empirical observations 
made in audio and/or video recordings of naturally occurring interactions. It is used for studying 
participants’ talk and bodily conduct, such as gaze and gestures, and how social interaction unfolds 
in real time, turn by turn. In other words, CA can show how talk and action lead to next actions and, 
consequently, how different ways of interacting lead to different outcomes. The audio-video 
recordings were recorded either with fixed action video cameras (GoPro) mounted on the dashboard 
of the car, or by a researcher sitting in the back seat with a hand-held video camera.  
When teams approach the incidents, the team members first need to figure out what the things they 
see are designed to represent in order to act accordingly. The incidents along the exercise route can 
be roughly divided into three categories: 
1) Something to investigate and report on; no immediate danger to the team members but 
possibly to others, 
2) Something to act upon; no immediate danger to the team members but possibly to others, and 
3) Something to observe from afar, report and call for help; the team members are in danger 
themselves. 
The studied cases (11 teams in total) are drawn from an incident where the teams encounter a mine 
accident, in which a UN peacekeeper patrol has driven their car into a minefield and gotten injured 
in the explosion. The incident can be placed in category 3), thus posing an imminent danger to the 
team. The incident is designed to be sudden and hard to anticipate, and requires quick thinking, 
knowledge of the correct procedures, and good communication between the trainees. At the same 
time, though, it is not unambiguous to the trainees what the setup is supposed to simulate, and in order 
to negotiate and initiate the correct next action, the trainees first need to make sense of what the 
simulated scene represents.  
The participants’ categorisations are crucial for the outcome of the situation – that is, whether the 
team comes out of the situation unharmed – as an incorrect interpretation of the simulated scene often 
leads to action that puts the team in danger. The data shows, for example, how certain phrases in the 
trainees’ conversations – such as “traffic accident involving UN”, “it seems to be some kind of 
accident”, and “they need help again” – indicate that the speaker treats the scene as a first aid task 
and thus projects first aid as the relevant next action. When a team jointly treats the incident as a 
category 2) incident, instead of category 3), they get close to the victims to provide help, which then 
leads to more casualties. Mobility is also an issue that affects the sense-making work. The teams who 
survived without casualties where those who kept their distance to the incident site and took their 
time to make more observations on which they based their assessment of the situation. Recurrently 
in these cases, one of the other team members – most often the team leader – tells the driver to stop 
after the initial noticing of the incident. If the driver does not immediately comply, the directive is 
upgraded by either increasing its pitch and volume, by repeating it multiple times, or both, until the 
driver stops the car. Observations made from a static car were more comprehensive than those made 
from a moving car, and thus more often lead to a successful outcome. 
The results of the study can be used in identifying good interactional practices that can be included 
as part of crisis management training, as well as to inform the future development and planning of 
course exercises. Furthermore, video-based empirical findings can bring new understanding to the 
course instructors and organisers on how the trainees communicate and cooperate with each other 
when they are working independently as a team, and are also more reliable in providing an accurate 
depiction on what happened than the participants’ own recounts of the events. All in all, having a 
better understanding of and providing empirical findings on how different interactional practices 
shape and affect action and joint decision-making in the context of a training exercise can improve 
military observer training and, consequently, help create a safer working environment for UNMOs in 
real operations. 
  
 
 
